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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
The view of the majority represents a step beyond any reported decision
and can be explained in part by a mistaken interpretation of the language
in the New York case and a desire not to be confronted by the difficulty of
determining when a reference is sufficient. 13  L. M. B.
CRIMINAL LAW- PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIM.INATION - RECORDS
KEPT By AccusED--[New York].-A New York statute' makes it a mis-
demeanor for the driver of a motor truck or bus, who has been on duty for
an aggregate of ten in any fourteen consecutive hours, again to go on duty
without at least eight consecutive hours off duty. The statute further pro-
vides that the driver shall keep records, showing his time on duty, for
exhibition on demand by any state policeman or peace officer. At the time
of his arrest, defendant's time card showed merely the hour at which he
had begun driving and the amount of time he had had off duty. By com-
paring these items with the time of arrest, the police officer concluded that
defendant had been driving for more than the statutory number of hours.
The time card and the testimony of the arresting officer were the only
evidence offered on behalf of the people. Held, that the introduction of the
time card in evidence did not unconstitutionally compel defendant to in-
criminate himself.2
The basis of the decision was that the time card, upon which no final
entry had been posted, showed nothing incriminatory on its face, because
supplemental testimony by the officer was needed in order to prove the
duration of the driving period. This case therefore places the time card in
the same category as reports of pharmacists,3 pawnbrokers, 4 and narcotics
dealers, 5 which may constitute evidence of an infraction of the law.6 The
13. "By thus requiring express notice on the bond, we preclude repeated
litigation to determine whether the referential language in any kind of
bond issue is adequate or not. We eliminate once for all the vexing problem
of negotiable corporate bonds, which is not questioned in the instant case."
Guardian Depositors Corp. v. David Stott Flour Mills, Inc. (Mich. 1939)
289 N. W. 122, 123.
1. N. Y. Thompson's Laws (1939) Labor Law, sec. 167.
2. People v. Creeden (N. Y. 1939) 24 N. E. (2d) 105.
3. State v. Smith (1888) 74 Iowa 580, 38 N. W. 492; State v. Cummins
(1888) 76 Iowa 133, 40 N. W. 124; State v. Huff (1888) 76 Iowa 200, 40
N. W. 720; State v. Elliott (1891) 45 Kan. 525, 26 Pac. 55; Commonwealth
v. Stevens (1892) 155 Mass. 291, 29 N. E. 508; People v. Henwood (1900)
123 Mich. 317, 82 N. W. 70; State v. Davis (1892) 108 Mo. 666, 18 S. W.
p94; State ex rel McClory v. Donovan (1901) 10 N. D. 203, 86 N. W. 709.
4. Launder v. Chicago (1884) 111 Ill. 291, 253 Am. Rep. 625; St. Joseph
v. Levin (1895) 128 Mo. 588, 31 S. W. 101. But see id. at 102 that in a
criminal proceeding, the pawnbroker could not be required to produce the
book to be used as evidence against him, or to permit an examination of it
for that purpose, because to do so would be an invasion of his constitutional
right.
5. United States v. Sherry (D. C. N. D. Ill. 1923) 294 Fed. 684.
6. But see Pople ex rel. Ferguson v. Reardon (1910) 197 N. Y. 236, 90
N. E. 829, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 141, where a statute taxing transfers of
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general rule is that "there is no compulsory self-crimination in a rule of
law which merely requires beforehand a future report on a class of future
acts among which a particular one may or may not in future be criminal
at the choice of the party reporting." 7 Such reports are generally ad-
mitted on the further ground that they have become public records.8
As the statute in question requires drivers to preserve their records for
sixty days, 9 it is possible that a driver may be arrested and a conviction
sought on the basis of his time card alone, for a violation which occurred
some days previously. 10 Two lines of authorities bear upon this hypo-
thetical situation, each presenting some analogies. In one, a distinction
seems to be drawn between statutes requiring reports which may be a link
in the chain of evidence, like those in the pharmacist and pawnbroker cases,
and statutes, such as the one under consideration, compelling reports which
will furnish the entire evidence upon which a conviction will be founded,
stock and requiring stockbrokers to furnish books and papers for inspection
was held invalid as requiring self-incrimination.
7. 4 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) 855, sec. 2259c(2) and cases cited.
See also Wilson v. United States (1911) 221 U. S. 361, 380, where the
Court said: "* * * in the case of public records and official documents, made
or kept in the administration of public office, the fact of actual possession
or of lawful custody would not justify the officer in resisting inspection,
even though the record was made by himself and would supply the evidence
of his criminal dereliction. * * * The principle applies not only to public
documents in public offices, but also to records required by law to be kept
in order that there may be suitable information of transactions which are
the appropriate subjects of governmental regulation and the enforcement of
restrictions validly established. There the privilege, which exists as to
private papers, cannot be maintained."
8. Marron v. United States (C. C. A. 9, 1925) 8 F. (2d) 251; State v.
Smith (1888) 74 Iowa 580, 38 N. W. 492; State v. Cummins (1888) 76
Iowa 133, 40 N. W. 124; State v. Davis (1892) 108 Mo. 666, 18 S. W. 894;
State ex rel. McClory v. Donovan (1901) 10 N. D. 203, 86 N. WV. 709. But
cf. State v. Pence (1909) 173 Ind. 99, 89 N. E. 488, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.)
818, where pharmacist's records of liquor sales were not admissible because
the statute requiring them to be kept did not provide that they become public
records open to inspection; and Commonwealth v. Stevens (1892) 155 Mass.
291, 29 N. E. 508, where druggist's records were not admissible because
requiring him to produce them in court would have been inconsistent with a
proper regard for his duty to keep them where entries of sales could be
immediately made.
9. N. Y. Thompson's Laws (1939) Labor Law, sec. 167.
10. In Louisville & N. R. R. v. Commonwealth (1899) 21 Ky. 239, 51
S. W. 167, the railroad was indicted for charging more for short than for
long hauls, and a tariff sheet required by law to be publicly posted was al-
lowed in evidence.
11. Ex parte Kneedler (1912) 243 Mo. 632, 147 S. W. 983, said that the
statute requiring report of automobile accident did not make the accident
itself a crime; People v. Rosenheimer (1913) 209 N. Y. 115, 102 N. E. 530,
held not sufficient to render the legislation invalid that the report of auto-
mobile accident might prove an important factor in leading to detection of
persons accused of crime. But cf. dissenting opinion in that case. Common-
wealth v. Showers (1937) 32 Pa. Dis. & Cty. Rep. 264, where it was held
that by accepting the privilege of operating a motor vehicle on the highways,
defendant waived his privilege of refusing to disclose any fact which might
be an essential link in the chain of evidence against him.
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Thus an ordinance requiring a "full report" of automobile accidents was
held invalid as requiring self-incrimination.12 These cases would indicate
that a conviction could not constitutionally be secured where the time card
is the only evidence. In the other line of cases, statutes requiring a motorist
in an accident merely to report his name, address and license number have
generally been held valid13 on the ground that the operation of a car on the
public highway is not a right but a privilege which, under the police power,
may be granted upon condition.14
There are, of course, important differences between problems presented
by the private motorist and the truck driver which may justify differences
in regulation. The individual motorist may occasionally be involved in an
auto accident, a conviction for which could be procured by evidence other
than that furnished by his own report. Further, the statutory requirement
of a report is not designed to be preventive of violation of the law. In
respect to a truck driver, on the other hand, it is manifestly impossible to
enforce the piohibitions of the New York statute in question otheiwise than
by requiring reports and permitting convictions based thereon. In addition,
it is the excessively long periods truck drivers operate which, unless pro-
hibited, occasion accidents. The statute requiring the filing of a report was
designed to prevent this. In this situation a court might feel that con-
siderations of policy against self-incrimination were overweighed by the
broad public policy behind the legislative enactment and it might sustain a
conviction on the basis of the evidence obtained from the time card alone.
This view seems to be supported even by the statement in the instant case
that "the obvious purpose of this law was to safeguard travelers upon the
highways."1
V. M.
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF MOTION PICTURES-[Missouri] .- Plaintiff,
while working in a clay mine, was injured by a premature explosion of dyna-
mite manufactured by the defendant company. To controvert plaintiff's alle-
gation of defendant's negligence in mixing the explosive and non-explosive
elements of the dynamite, defendant offered in evidence motion pictures of
the manufacturing process. Although the case was reversed and remanded,
the court upheld the refusal of the lower court to admit the motion pictures
on the grounds that the film contained irrelevant and prejudicial matter.
However, the court stated that motion pictures are admissible in evidence
12. Rembrandt v. Cleveland (1927) 28 Ohio App. 4, 161 N. E. 364.
13. Lashley v. State (1938) 236 Ala. 1, 180 So. 717, (1938) 28 Ala. App.
86, 180 So. 720; People v. Diller (1914) 24 Cal. App. 799, 142 Pac. 797; In re
.Jones (Fla. 198:8) 178 So. 424; Ex parte Kneedler (1912) 243 Mo. 632,
147 S. W. 983, Ann. Cas. 1913C 923, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 622; State v.
Sterrin (1916) 78 N. H. 220, 98 At. 483; People v. Rosenheimer (1913)
209 N. Y. 115, 102 N. E. 530, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 977; Commonwealth v.
Showers (1937) 32 Pa. Dis. & Cty. Rep. 264.
14. Sce note 1,3, supra, and 8 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law
f,,,l PractWe (Pern. ed. 1935) 134, 135, sec. 5399.
17,. (N. Y. 1989) 24 N. E. (2d) 105, 107.
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